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NATIONAL BANKS AND MUTUAL FUNDS: WHERE CAN THEY
GO AFTER INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE v. CAMP?
INTODUCTION
The question of what activities properly constitute the business of
commercial banking is one that has recently come under close scrutiny
and for the most part, has gone unresolved.1 At present there can be
established no all inclusive definition since the banking industry is
still seeking new areas of expansion which are unrelated to the
traditional concepts of the role of commercial banking. The popular
term which may be attributed to these various activities is full service
banking and within recent years banks have sought to extend the
scope of this term to its fullest extent. Commercial banks have entered
into the fields of insurance, travel agencies, leasing of trucks, auto-
mobiles and equipment generally, leasing of computer time and render-
ing accounting services, underwriting of revenue bonds, issuance of
credit cards and the underwriting and distributing of mutual fund
shares. 2 In many of these activities the invading banks have been
challenged in both the courts3 and by Congress. 4 This comment will
focus on one particular segment of the commercial bank expansion,
the incursion into the mutual fund field,5 through an analysis of the
Beatty, What are the legal limits to the expansion of national bank services?,
86 THE BANXrI L.J. 3 (1969); Harfield, Sermon on Genesis 17:20: Exodus 1:10(a proposal for testing the propriety of expanding bank services), 85 THE BANKING
L.J. 565 (1968); Huck, What is the banking business?, 21 TnE Busnrrss LAwYER
587 (1966); Note, Diversifcation by National Banks, 21 STAN. L. REv. 650 (1969).
2 Hearings on MutualFund Legislation of 1967 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 3, at 1249 (1967).3 Arnold Tours v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969), reed and remanded
400 U.S. 45 (1970) (travel agencies); Wingate Corp. v. Industrial National Bank,
408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 987 (1970) (data processing);
Assoc. of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir.
1969), rev'd and remanded 897 U.S. 150 (1970) (data processing). Port of N.Y.
Authority v. Baker, Watts and Co., 892 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (revenue bond
underwriting).
4 Bank Credit-Card and Check-Credit Plans, Hearings Before the Subcom. on
Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); Hearings on S. 2704 Col-
lective Investment Funds Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter 1966 Hearings]; Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, Hearings on Mutual Funds Legislation of 1967,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter 1967 Hearings]; Hearings on H.R. 8499
and H.R. 9410 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) [herein-
after 1964 Hearings].
5 Congressional Quarterly Almanac Vol. XXVI, at 891 (1970) defines mutual
funds:
A mutual fund is an investment company in which a number of persons
invest money and which re-invests these funds in stocks or other assets....
The primary attraction of mutual funds is that they offer the
(Continued on next page)
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successful battle, both judicial and legislative, to prevent that entry
and the prospects for the future.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Prior to 1962 it was certain that commercial banks could not enter
the mutual fund field. During that time trust activities of commercial
banks were under the control of the Federal Reserve Board which
unequivocally maintained that the entrance of commercial banks into
the mutual fund field would be a violation of the Glass-Steagell Bank-
ing Act of 1933.6 [hereinafter Banking Act]. However, at the in-
sistance of the banking industry7 that control was turned over in 1962
to the Comptroller of the Currency8 who solicited suggestions for
improving the regulations applicable to trust activities.9 The industry
responded with suggestions which would allow them to commingle
investment monies delivered to them for investment management;' 0
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
advantages of diversified investment in a single company. Shareholders
receive the benefits of growth or income, or both, from all assets in a
fund's portfolio of investments in different companies or activities.
Ordinarily the breadth of the portfolio protects them from severe loss
resulting from a drop in value or income of any single investment.
6 42 FED. RESERVE BULL. 228 (1956); 41 FED. REsERVE BuLL. 142 (1955); 26
FED. RESERVE BULL. 898 (1940). The Board maintained that a bank operating a
commingled investment fund would violate Section 16 (12 U.S.C. § 24) and
Section 21 (12 U.S.C. § 878) of the Glass-Steagell Banking Act, Section 16 provides
in part that:
* . . The business of dealing in securities and stock by the [national
banking] association shall be limited to purchasing and selling such
securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the
account of, customers, and in no case for its own account, and the
association shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock ...
Except as hereinafter provided or otherwise permitted by law, nothing
herein contained shall authorize the purchase by the [national banking]
association for its own account of any shares of stock of any corpora-
tion....
Section 21 provides in part that:
tIlt shall be unlawful-(1) For any person, firm, corporation, associa-
tion, business trust or other similar organization, engaged in the business
of issuing underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or retail,
or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or
other securities, to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in
the business of [deposit banking]....
7 See generally Hearings on H.R. 12577 and H.R. 12825 Before a Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).8 12 U.S.C. § 92(a) (1970). This statute gave the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency the power to authorize national banks "to act as trustee, executor, administra-
tor, registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, com-
mittee of estates of lunatics, or in any other fiduciary capacity in which State
banks, trust companies, or other corporations which come into competition with
national banks are permitted to act under the laws of the State in which the
National bank is located."
9 Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
10 Prior to 1968, commercial banks were able to solicit investment funds
(Continued on next page)
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the suggestions were in effect, to allow for the operation of a mutual
fund. In 1963 the proposed regulations were officially promulgated. 1
Two years later First National City Bank of New York [hereinafter
City Bank] submitted for the Comptroller's approval a plan for a
commingled investment fund [hereinafter CIF]. The plan was ac-
cepted 12 and the fund put into operation, quickly amassing $11 million
in fund assets in the first two years of its existence.13 The solicitation
for CIF funds was, however, soon brought to a halt by a decision in
federal district court.14 In a suit by an association of mutual fund
dealers the district court agreed that the CIF was in violation of
sections 12, 20, 21, and 32 of the Banking Act15 and enjoined the plans
operation. This decision was appealed and on appeal was consolidated
with a second suit1 challenging certain exemptions granted the bank
by the Securities and Exchange Commission [hereinafter SEC] from
parts of the Investment Company Act of 1940 [hereinafter Investment
Act]. The Court of Appeals reversed as to the district court's decision
and affirmed as to the SEC's exemptions and gave the go-ahead to the
CIF.17 The bank's victory, however, was short lived as the Supreme
Court reversed the circuit court in Investment Company Institute v.
Camp,' basing their decision entirely on provisions of the Banking
Act.1 9
(Footnote continued rom preceding page)
and to manage them for individual customers but could not commingle them.
They could, however, commingle trust assets, and funds held as part of a tax-
exempt pension or profit sharing or stock bonus plan of employers for the benefit
of employees. See, Regulation F, 12 C.F.R. § 206 (1959 Rev.).
The commingling of trust assets was, however, closely watched by the
Federal Reserve Board to ensure that revocable trusts were not being used to
attract "individuals seeking investment management of their funds." 42 FED.
RESERVE BuLL. 228 (1956). At one time the Federal Reserve Board proposed to
forbid the use of common trust funds for revocable trusts because of the possibility
that they could be used as a commingled investment fund. See, R. MuNDHEi,
MuTruAL FuNDs 8 (1970).
1112 C.F.R. § 9 (1963).
12 Letter from the Comptroller of the Currency to First National City Bank,
May 10, 1964, printed in 1966 Hearings, supra note 4, at 418-21.
The fund also received authority from the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, see, S.E.C. Investment Co. Act Release No. 4538 (March 9, 1966, as amended
March 14,11966) printed in 1966 Hearings, supra note 4, at 81-90.
13A of September, 1967, there were 654 participants in the fund and assets
of $11,610,682. After the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's ruling the
fund was re-opened and as of November 20, 1969 had 469 participants and fund
assets of $11,174,908. N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1969, § C at 78, col. 1.
'4 Investment Company Institute v. Camp. 274 F.Supp. 624 (D.D.C. 1967).
15 12 U.S.C. §H 24, 377, 378 and 678 (1970).
16 The opinions and orders of the SEC are reprinted in the 1966 Hearings,
supra note 4, at 81.
17 National Ass'n of Security Dealers Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n,
420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. granted 397 U.S. 986.
18 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
19 Section 16, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1970), and section 21, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1970),
of the Glass-Steagell Banking Act.
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While this judicial battle was taking place the banking industry
was also involved in legislative activity where several attempts were
made to provide for the approval of a bank operated CIF. The most re-
cent of these attempts was a bill introduced by Senator McIntyre of
New Hampshire which would have indirectly amended the Banking Act
to give positive approval to a bank operated CIF.20 Similar legislation
was introduced in the House of Representatives but was not reported
out of committee,21 largely because the legislature wished to defer
action until the Supreme Court's decision in Investment Company In-
stitute v. Camp. The McIntyre Bill was able to pass the Senate but
without a House counterpart it was excised in the Joint House-Senate
Conference Committee.22
Tim BANK OPEATED CIF
The CIF put into operation by City Bank is representative of the CIFs
under Regulation 923 and is said to be the model for all future CIFs.
Under that plan the customer tenders to the bank an amount between
$10,000 and $500,000 which is added to the fund. In addition the
customer authorizes the bank to be his managing agent for the invest-
ment of fund assets. In exchange the customer receives a written
20 S.2704, A Bill to Amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the
Investment Act of 1940, to Provide for the Regulation of Collective Investment
Funds Maintained by Banks, and for Other Purposes.
The McIntyre Amendment would treat the CIF "as an open-end investment
company and make such funds subject to the regulatory requirements of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 and the registration and other provisions of
the Securities Act of 1933. At the same time Federal banking agencies would
continue to exercise their general authority to supervise these funds from the
standpoint of safe and sound trust and banking practices. Nevertheless the pro-
posed amendment would place the principal regulatory responsibility in the
Securities and Exchange Commission, to be exercised under the Federal Securities
laws.
Additionally the McIntyre Amendment would unconditionally prohibit such
a fund, when maintained by a bank, from including a sales load in the public
offering price of any security issued. Thus a CIF operated by a bank would be
essentially similar to a no-load mutual fund and would be accorded the same
treatment under the 1940 Act." 1967 Hearings, supra note 4, at 1293.
21 H.R. 9410 and 8499, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., (1964).2 2 Congressional Quarterly Almanac Vol. XXVI, at 894 (1970); CCH
Congressional Index, The Week in Congress, Nov. 27, 1970.
The Senate passed bill authorized banks and savings and loan associa-
tions to operate mutual funds. The House bill left the issue of mutual
fund operation by banks and savings and loans institutions to be settled
by a case pending before the Supreme Court. But it provided for regula-
tion of CIFs if they were upheld-by the Court. Conferees eliminated both
House and Senate provisions on the subject.2 3 Regulation 9 is printed in 12 C.F.R. § 9 (1983) and includes the rules
governing the operation of a collective investment fund by national banks as set
out by the Comptroller of the Currency. These rules are made under the authority
of 12 U.S.C. 92(a) (1970). See supra note 8.
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evidence of his investment, expressing in "units of participation" his
proportionate interest in the fund's assets. These units of participation
are redeemable by the fund at their net asset value, and are freely
transferable to any person who has executed a managing agreement
with the bank. The account which is directed by a committee elected
annually by the fund's participants, is registered as an investment
company under the Investment Act24 and the "units of participation"
are registered under the Securities Act of 193325 [hereinafter Securi-
ties Act]. The bank through its committee, acts both as investment
advisor to the account and statutory underwriter for the "units of
participation."20
The CIF is the functional equivalent of a mutual fund but the two
differ in several respects. As in all banking functions, the bank
operated CIF is subject to the supervision of the Comptroller of the
Currency.27 This would include the review of fund investments to
insure that they are in accordance with sound fiduciary principles.28
Additionally banks would be limited to a service charge of V of 1%
per annum of the average net asset value of the fund.29 Open-end
mutual funds charge a "load charge," which is principally a sales
commission, on the amount paid or the amount invested. 0 The final
distinction is that banks may advertise their CIF only through their
trust department and may not market their "units of participation"
through regular channels of public distribution.8 ' Mutual funds, how-
ever, are not subject to such a limitation and the industry is noted for
its aggressive salesmanship.
It is quite clear why banks would seek entry into the mutual fund
field and equally apparent why the mutual fund industry would seek
to keep them out. The fantastic rise of the mutual fund industry has
been chronicled in numerous publications and has become the envy
within the financial world. In 1940 the total assets of all investment
companies were approximately $2 billion and mutual fund assets less
than $450 million. In 1970 the Investment Company Institute, which
comprised 93% of the mutual fund industry, listed 339 mutual funds
as members of the Institute with total assets of $45 billion. At that
24 15 U.S.C. § 80(a) et. seq. (1970).
25 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) et. seq. (1970).2GInvestment Compan Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 622-623 (1971).
2712 C.F.R. § 9.18 b) (1) (1968).
2812 C.F.R. § 9.11(d)(1968).
2912 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(12) (1968). The charge is set so as not to exceed the
sum of the fees charged if the account were managed individually.3o Congressional Quarterly Almanac Vol. XXVI, at 891 (1970). Most
funds charge a sales fee of 8.5% of the amount paid, or 9.3% of the amount
actually invested.3112 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(5)(iii) and (iv) (1968).
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time Institute members had 10.5 million shareholder accounts and
almost one of every six of the 31 million Americans owning stock in
1970 held mutual fund shares.32 The banking industry has a ready
made access to this market, primarily through its association with
investors in its trust and investment management departments, but
also because of its position at the heart of economic life. Because of
these assets banks should make quick and substantial gains in the
mutual fund field and it is precisely for that reason that the mutual
fund industry has registered such strong opposition. Shortly before
City Bank began its CIF it was estimated that banks would capture
as much as $2 billion of mutual fund business within the following
ten years.38  Although subsequent judicial decisions have negated
that estimate, fifty major banks were ready to start CIFs if the McIn-
tyre legislation became law. 4 However, with the substantial interest
of banks in the operation of CIFs and the large amount to be won if
they are successful, it is not likely that this issue will end with the
demise of the McIntyre legislation and the ruling in Investment Com-
pany Institute v. Camp.
HISTORY
Before there can be a proper analysis of the reasons for and against
bank entry into mutual funds, it is necessary to make mention of the
underlying history which caused the separation of investment and
commercial banking. During the 19th century American banks fol-
lowed the financial policy established in England that there must be a
sharp dichotomy between institutions involved in investment banking
and those involved in commercial banking.8 5 American banks had no
problem living with this principle since they were unchallenged in
their sphere of activities.8 6 However, in the latter part of the 19th
century trust companies began to emerge as rivals of commercial
banks. Although at first these companies were limited to the adminis-
tration of estates and wills they soon began soliciting deposits from
the general public as well as engaging in the preparation and distribu-
tion of securities.37 The banking industry rose to the challenge and,
with legislative approval, entered new fields, one of which was the
82 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. XXVI, at 891 (1970).
3 1964 Hearings, supra note 4, at 26.
34 Statement by American Bankers Association in The Wall Street Journal,
June 13, 1968, at 3, col. 4.3 5 Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History,
88 TnE BANK G L.J. 483, 485 (1971). For an in-depth study of the history of
investment banking see, V. CAnosso, INvsnmr BANKxN IN AsmmcA (1970).36 Perkins, supra note 35, at 486-87.
t Id. at 487-88.
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securities field.38 By the turn of the 20th century the distinction
between banks and trust companies was one of semantics as both
offered a full range of services to their customers.39
Although there was criticism of bank incursion into other fields,
most notably the securities field,40 it was apparent that there was
insufficient regulatory power to solve the problem and little pre-
dilection to authorize additional power.41 The banking industry was
in a state of regulatory chaos as forty-nine legislative bodies were
imposing varing degrees of supervision on and granting widely dis-
similar privileges to banks.4- Where banks were restrained from
directly entering investment banking they often did so by means of a
security affiliate.43 By 1922 sixty-two commercial banks were involved
38 Id. at 489.
39 Id.
4OAs early as 1912 a Subcommittee of the House Banking and Currency
Committee began investigating the concentration of money and credit. The Pujo
Committee (so named because Rep. Arsene P. Pujo headed the Committee) took
unfavorable notice of the growth of the affiliate phenomenon but its findings went
largely unheeded. See Pujo REPoRT, MoNEY TRUST INVrsTIGATIoN, H.R. REP. No.
1593, 62nd Cong., 3rd Sess. (1913). See also V. Carosso, supra note 35, at 137-55.
This fact was again mentioned in 1920 by the Comptroller of the Currency
who observed in his annual report to Congress that:
Some 'securities companies' operating in close connection with, and often
officered by, the same men who managed the national banks with
which they are allied, have become instruments of speculation and head-
quarters for promotions of all kinds of financial schemes. Many of the
flotations promoted by the 'securities corporations' which are operated
as adjuncts to national have proven disastrous to their subscribers, and
have in some instances reflected seriously not only upon the credit andthe standing of the 'securities companies' by which they are sponsored
but also in some cases have damaged the credit and reputation of national
banks with which the 'securities companies' are allied.
In times of rising prices and active speculation, some of these
auxiliary corporations have made large profits through their ventures
and syndicate operations, but their losses in other periods have been
heavy, and they have become an element of increasing peril to the banks
with which they are associated. The business of legitimate banking is
entirely separate and distinct from the kind of business conducted by
many of the 'securities corporations' and it would be difficult if not
impossible for the same set of officers to conduct safely, soundly, and
successfully the conservative business of the national banks and at the
same time direct and manage the speculative ventures and promotions
of the ancillary institutions.
1 Ann. Rep. of the Comptroller of the Currency 55 (1920).4 1 Whitesell, Is the Glass-Steagell Act Obsolete?, 87 Tim B cG L.J. 387,
394-95 (1970).4 2 Lehr, The Affiliation of Commercial Bank and Mutual Fund Personnel, 10
ST. Louis U. L.J. 190, 194 (1965).
43 V. Carosso, supra note 35, at 97-98.
Security affiliates were state-chartered corporations owned by the stock-
holders of the national bank that sponsored them. They were 'officered
and directed' by the individuals who managed the bank. To make certain
that ownership of the affiliate and the bank always remained identical,
stockholders could not buy or sell stock in one without also doing so in
(Continued on next page)
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in such activities directly and another ten had security affiliates for
the same purpose.4 4 Together these banks and their affiliates were able
to exercise a powerful influence on the securities market.45
The results of this chaotic period were numerous abuses, especially
by the larger banks, all of which contributed to the large number of
bank failures and the ensuing depression. Banks amassed large sums
of money which they invested in speculative securities by offering the
high rates of interest on long term deposits. Loans were made to shore-
up faltering companies in which the lending bank had a substantial
interest or the bank was able to dump its interest in the faltering
company onto its security affiliate. Vast sums were made by bank
officers and directors at the expense of the public through the manipula-
tion of securities. In short, the banking industry was caught up in a
massive conflict of interest for which there was inadequate safeguards
and a great deal of abuse.47
In the period that followed the failure of the Bank of the United
States,48 the public clamored for remedial legislation.49 Congress re-
sponded with the enactment of three major pieces of legislation, the
Glass-Steagell Banking Act of 1933,50 the Securities Act of 193351 and
the Investment Company Act of 1940,52 which were to prevent future
abuses.
The Banking Act dealt, in part, with the specific hazards of corn-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
the other. Usually the same share of stock was used for both, one side
bearing the name of the national bank and the other that of the
affiliate.4 4 Perkins, supra note 85, at 492.
45 Id. at 495. A specific example of this power was that in 1927 the market
share of new bond issue participations of commercial banks was 37% and by
1930 this figure rose to 61%.
46 Lehr, supra note 42, at 196.
47 Lehr, supra note 42, at 196; V. Carosso, supra note 35, at 322-52; Whitesell,
supra note 41, at 396; Investment Company Institute V. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629-
34 (1971).4 8 Perkins, supra note 85, at 496-97.
A most significant event that incited public opinion against the security
affiliate system was the failure of the Bank of the United States in
December 1930. The president of the New York bank, Bernard Marcus,
had appropriated vast quantities of the bank's funds for his own personal,
and highly speculative business ventures. The eventual financial dif-
ficulties of these outside investments made it impossible for Marcus to
repay his loans. The bank was finally forced to suspend payment and
to close its doors. When it failed, the bank had over $200 million in
deposits, many of them owned by immigrants who erroneously believed
the bank's name indicated a close connection with the national govern-
ment.... Because this was the largest bank failure in American financial
history, the story gained extensive national exposure....49 Lehr, supra note 42, at 198.
50 Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
5115 U.S.C. § 77(a)-aa (1970).
52 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1970).
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mercial bank's involvement in the security field. Although the initial
response of Congress was to enact a comprehensive regulatory scheme,
the increasing number of bank failures and the demands of the public
called for a complete divorce,53 essentially, the act sought to prohibit a
commercial bank dealing in securities for its own account. Blessed
with the aid of hindsight, it was recognized by Congress that such
self-dealing by a bank could jeopardize its solvency if the investments
were unsuccessful. An additional hazard which was recognized was
that a bank faced with an unprofitable investment in its portfolio
might further jeopardize its own solvency by making an unsound loan
in the hope of reviving the faltering investment. An equally apparent
danger was that a bank might use its position to sell its unproductive
stock to its unwary customers.54 In order to carry out this divorce, the
Banking Act was directed at preventing commercial banks from en-
gaging in investment banking either directly or indirectly. Section 20
and 32 effectively blocked the indirect approach through the use of
affiliates. Section 20 prohibited the affiliation of commercial banks with
business "engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting,
public sale or distribution" of securities.5 5 Section 21 took the obverse
position by prohibiting companies in the business of the "issuing,
underwriting, selling or distributing" of securities from engaging in
commercial banking.50 Section 32 additionally prevented the use of
affiliates by proscribing any employee of a security organization from
being an employee of a commercial bank.57 This provision was aimed
at interlocking directorates between investment companies and com-
mercial banks, a common occurrence in the pre-depression days.58
Finally, in order to prevent a bank from doing directly what it could
not do indirectly, via an affiliate, section 16 limited commercial banks
to dealing in securities solely for the account of its customers and
"in no case for its own account."59
The Securities Act was aimed less at the banking industry in
particular than at the abuses existing in the securities market gen-
53 Perkins, supra note 35, at 505. Initially it was not certain whether the
affiliate system would be made subject to new regulations or if a complete divorce
would be enforced. In fact the preliminary draft of the Banking Act included two
sections related to the affiliate question. The first would allow banks to continue
operating their affiliates but only if the entire operation of the bank was open to
federal or state inspection. The alternative plan called for a complete severance
within five years, of commercial banks and their affiliates.54 See text accompanying note 47.
55 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1970).
56 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1970).
57 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
58 Whitesell, supra note 41, at 396.
5912 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1970).
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erally. Ignorance of the true facts and outright deception were com-
mon shortcomings of the pre-depression market. Congress sought to
alleviate this problem by providing for full disclosure, by means of a
prospectus, for all new issues of securities, offered in interstate com-
merce.60 Criminal and civil penalties were provided under sections 1761
and 12(2)62 for the fraudulent sale of securities in interstate com-
merce.
The last major piece of legislation affecting commercial banks, the
Investment Act, was designed to prevent those possible abuses that
were not adequately provided for by either the Banking Act or the
Securities Act. Whereas the function of the Banking Act was to
separate commercial banking from investment banking, the Investment
Act left intact the primary framework of the investment industry but
enacted an extensive regulatory scheme. 63 The evil that the act sought
to remedy was the use of the investment company as a vehicle for the
private gains of insiders at the expense of the investment company's
shareholders. 64 Section 10 accomplished this by providing that a
certain percentage of directors must be free of affiliations which would
involve a conflict of interest. The percentage under section 10 varies
according to the type of affiliation involved.6 5
Tim B Gxc A r TODAY
The Supreme Court has finally laid to rest the issue of whether the
City Bank plan violates the Banking Act. In so doing the Court held
that the issuance of "units of participation" by the bank to its investors
constituted an "underwriting, issuing, selling or distributing of securi-
ties in violation of sections 16 and 21" of the Act.66 Furthermore, the
Court found that the purpose and intent of the plan clashed with the
purpose of the Act since "the potential hazards and abuses that flow
from... (the City Bank's) entry into the mutual investment business
are the same basic hazards and abuses that Congress intended to
eliminate forty years ago." 67
The judicial determination, however, does not, nor should it,
answer the more basic question of the banking Act's relevancy in
today's financial community. Whether that relevancy may still exist
60 Note, Commingled Investment Accounts: Banks & Securities Industry, 45
NonRE DAmE LAWvYER 746, 758-54 (1970).
6148 Stat. 74 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1970).
62 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(2) (1970).
63 Lehr, supra note 42, at 201.




depends on the possibility of a recurrence of the abuses which the
Banking Act was designed to prevent. Principally there are four pos-
sible abuses:
1) A bank might invest its own assets in frozen or otherwise
imprudent stock or security investments. 68 The blunt answer to this
is that it is impossible in a CIF under Regulation 9. This is because
all purchases are made by the fund for the customers account and at
no time may bank assets be used to purchase securities. Regulation 9
makes this quite clear:
A bank administering a collective investment fund shall not (a)
have any interest in such fund other than in its fiduciary capacity or
(b) make any loans on the security of a participation in such fund.
If because of a creditor relationship or otherwise the bank ac-
quires an interest in a participation in such fund, the participation
shall be withdrawn on the first date on which such withdrawal can
be effected .... 19
2) Since the CIF is operated by the bank, the public will merge
the two so that a poor performance by the fund could endanger the
public's confidence in other bank activities." Initially it would take a
rather naive and unsophisticated public to fail to perceive the dis-
tinction between the management of a commercial bank and the
performance of an investment fund.71 But even so, today banks hold
about $250 billion in various fiduciary capacities,1 2 a large part of
which banks invest and re-invest everyday, and there is no indication
that bank stability is judged by its performance in these areas.
Actually it is more likely that public confidence in banks is based on
the guaranteed protection of their deposits by the FDIC rather than
on a bank's investment ability.
3) A bank might use, or better yet abuse, its credit facilities in
order to bolster a corporation in which the fund has invested.73
This is a variation of the pre-depression abuse involving the making
of loans to a corporation in which the bank had invested for its own
68 Id. at 630.
69 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(8)(i) (1964).
7oInvestment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 631 (1971).
711967 Hearings at 1224 (letter from William McChesney Martin).
72 STAF OF SUnCOMM. ON DomEs'nc FINANCE, HOUSE Comm. ON BANxING
AND CURRENCY, 90TH CONG. 2D SEss. ComnlEaciAL BANKS AND THim TRUST
AcrivrnEs: EMERGING INFLUENCE ON THE AMERCAN ECONOMY at I (Subcomm.
Print 1968) [hereinafter Domsaic FINANCE REPORT]. Of this estimated $253.3 bil-
lion, $72.9 billion were in employee benefit accounts, $126.2 billion in private trust
accounts and $54.2 billion in agency accounts. Since these figures were estimated
at the end of 1967 it is apparent that the totals have since increased substantially,
however there is no reliable data on present bank holdings.73 lnvestment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 631 (1971).
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account. Now, rather than protecting its own investment, it is indi-
cated that a bank may do the same in order to protect the fund's
performance. There is no denying that this possibility exists but it
likewise exists in all of the various banking investment activities includ-
ing trust management of pension and profit sharing plans. The danger,
however, is small considering the lack of abuse associated with bank
investments in other capacities.74
4) The pecuniary interest of the bank in selling the fund may
cause it to use undue pressure to steer customers into the fund.75
Again the pre-depression abuse, which involved banks dealing in and
underwriting securities for its own account and often to the detriment
of its customers, differs perceptively from the present situation. Now
the possible abuse lies in an over-aggressive policy on the part of the
bank to induce customer participation and build up management fees.
It has been suggested in this respect, that a bank might even extend
credit to a customer with the expectation of investment in the fund.76
At the heart of this proposition lies the rationale that in order for
banks to exist in the highly competitive mutual fund field they must be
as aggressive as any of their competitors and that this aggressiveness
may lead to unsound practices.77 It is not a complete answer to say
that a bank faces stiff competition in the trust and pension manage-
ment fields as well since banks have long been established in these
fields and the problems of competition are not the same as those faced
when just entering the field.78 There is no question that banks do have
subtle powers of persuasion due to their unique position at the center
of economic life which are not available to their competitors.79
Whether banks would use these coercive powers is open to conjecture
74 Supra note 71.
75 Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630 (1971).
76 Id. at 631.
77 1967 Hearings at 80 (statement of Eugene Rostow).
The trust business of banks, in the nature of things, derives from the
banks' relationsbips with its customers, with lawyers, and with insurance
Nagents.... (A) bank's trust accounts... do not. . . normally involve
the active daily battle for business characteristic of the work of brokers
and dealers. One of the purposes of the Glass Steagell Act was to keep
the banks out of this market, with its built-in and inescapable conflicts
of interest.
78 Id.
In the conduct of a trust department of the classical kind, a bank is under
no pressure to sell interests in its own collective investment trust. Its
fees and commissions as trustee, guardian, or executor do not depend on
whether trust assets are managed in the common trust fund, or in a
separate account. But if the law develops to allow for collective invest-
ment funds, the banks would have a pecuniary interest in advising their
customers to purchase interests in their own collective investment funds.
79 Id. at 1249.
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but even should it so desire the limitation of fund advertising to the
bank trust department would restrict such activities to a minimum.8 0
P'ROBLmmS WrrH =HE NwsTvsmNT Acr
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Banking Act made it
unnecessary for the Court to answer the issues arising from the
exemptions afforded City Bank by the SEC.81 The bank applied for
and received exemptions from several sections of the Investment Act,
most notably §§ 10(b)(2), (b)(3) and (C).12 These exemptions
were needed to allow the fund to conform with banking regulations
which demanded that the bank have a working majority on the fund's
committee.83 Since a strict interpretation of the Investment Act would
prevent such a majority control, the exemptions were sought. Under
§§ 10(b)(2) and (b)(3) no principal underwriter of a fund nor any
investment banker may be a director, officer or employee of the invest-
ment fund unless a majority of the directors were unaffiliated with
the underwriter or investment banker. Additionally § 10(c) would
specifically prohibit a majority of the board of directors from being
officers, directors or employees of any one bank.
Bank exemption was sought under § 6(c) of the Act84 which em-
powers the Commission to grant exemptions:
... if and to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of
the investors and the purposes fairly intended by the policy and
provisions (of the Act) ... .85
The granting of the exemptions allowed the bank fund to operate
under the general provisions of § 10(a) which limits directors with
outside interests to sixty percent of the board.,
When presented with the issue of the justification for these exemp-
tions, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's actions. How-
ever, since the Supreme Court has not dealt with this question it is
imperative that any final settlement of the CIF question should
8 0 See text accompanying note 31 supra.81l Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620-21 (1971).
82 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(b)(2), (b)(3) and (c) (1964).83 Nat lAss'n of Security Dealers v. See. and Exch. Comm'n, 420 F.2d 83,
92 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
84 rOigiall the bank sought an exemption so as to allow it to operate under
section 10(d) ofthe Investment Company Act. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10( d) (1964).
This section permits certain types of no-load funds to have only one unaffihiated
director if they meet specified conditions. The SEC denied the bank's request
and the bank did not appeal.
8515 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1964).
88 15 U.S.C. § 80a-lO0a) (1964).
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answer the issues arising from these exemptions. Specifically, the issue
is whether the bank plan, with the exemptions, provides for sufficient
protection of investors against conflicts of interest on the part of the
fund's committee. Former Chairman of the SEC, William L. Cary,
has indicated that the exemptions create four danger areas:87
1) The bank might retain an unwarranted portion of the fund's
assets in deposits, the bank being able to use the deposits for its own
profit or in meeting cash reserve requirements of the Federal Reserve.88
Although it is a real possibility that a bank may find that the interest
received from loans is, at a particular time, more lucrative than the
management fee from the fund, there are sufficient safeguards to limit
the likelihood of such action.89 Under the Securities Act and the Invest-
ment Act participants in the fund would receive a prospectus which
includes a specific statement of the fund's defined investment policy
and the fees and other charges payable to the fund. 0 Moreover the
participants would receive periodic reports and, as soon as possible,
a balance sheet and income statement for a recent period and a list
of the fund's securities. The form of the information required to be
given to the participants is under the control of the SEC and, if the
Commission so desires, may be in such a form as to allow a comparison
with other investment media.91 In addition to the protection that dis-
closure provides, the requirement of a 40% unaffiliated committee
allows for an insider's scrutiny of the majority's activities.9 2 Further
barriers to abuse are erected by Regulation 9 which provides that
funds held in a CIF "shall not be held uninvested or undistributed
any longer than is reasonable for the proper management of the
account."93 Adherence would be maintained through the periodic
87 See Hearing on Common Trust Funds-Overlapping Responsibility and Con-
flict in Regulations, Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations,
88d Cong., 1st Sess 11-12 (1963) (statement of William L. Cary).88 Re parties briefs can be found in the 1966 Hearings, supra note 4, at 187-
579. 89 The Court of Appeals dismissed this point by relying on the Commission's
argument that:
the temptation to leave funds uninvested would be contrary to the Ac-
count's stated policy of investment for long-term growth of capital and
income, and to the Bank's interest in having the fund's assets increase.
The interest in increasing the assets in the fund dictates not only that
funds already held be invested ingrowth securities, but also, as we have
seen, creates pressure to increase the number of participants. The undis-
puted fact that the Account will compete with the mutual fund industry
can be expected to inhibit retention of its income-producing assets in
the form of lopsided cash deposits.
Nat'1 Ass'n of Security Dealers v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 420 F.2d 83, 93 (1969).90 1966 Hearings, supra note 4, at 207-08 (brief of First Nat'l City Bank).
91 Id.
9215 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1964).
9312 C.F.R. § 9.10(a) (1964).
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examinations of bank trust departments which occur at least three
times every two years.94
2) A bank might make a bad investment for the fund in order to
shore-up an unsound loan. This is opposite to the argument, previ-
ously discussed, that a bank might be inclined to make a bad loan in
order to aid a faltering company in which the fund had invested. The
discussion of that point applies equally well here. As stated by William
McChesney Martin, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board:
Although such conflicts of interest and consequent misconduct
are. not impossible, this area of risk is not regarded as significant.
For many years banks have participated in the management of
employee-benefit funds and other fiduciary accounts that hold
stocks and other securities in an aggregate amount far exceeding
those held by the entire mutual fund industry. The examinations
conducted by bank supervisory agencies have disclosed practically
no such misuse by banks of their investment advisory and manage-
ment functions. In the case of managing agency funds, an addi-
tional safeguard is the prophylactic restrictions and requirements
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, particularly publicity of
the financial transactions of registered investment companies, which
almost inevitably would expose such malfeasance. A further deter-
rent would be the adverse impact on a collective fund's perfor-
mance-its comparative financial record-if any of its resources
were used to make unprofitable investments; the detrimental effect
on sales of participations might outweigh any benefits the bank
could reasonably expect from its breach of fiduciary duty.95
3) The fund might be used as a dumping ground for securities
underwritten by the bank. This is the problem to which § 10(b) (3)
of the Investment Act was specifically addressed, where a ma-
jority of the board of the investment company would be both
underwriting and purchasing securities. The present situation, how-
ever, is a substantial change from the activities that gave rise to section
10(b) (3) in which investment banks used their controlled investment
companies as a dumping ground for underwritten security issues. To-
day, a commercial bank's involvement in underwriting securities is
limited to its participation in syndicates which underwrite government
securities.90 This situation bears little resemblance to the underwriting
of highly speculative securities which occurred in the pre-depression
years.97 There is, however, the additional protection afforded by Regu-
94 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1964).
951967 Heaings, supra note 4, at 1224.
96 Nat'l Ass'n of See. Dealers v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 420 F.2d 83, 94
(D.C. Cir. 1969).97 Note, supra note 60, at 794-95.
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lation 9 against self-dealing that was noted in the discussion of pos-
sible abuses to protect outstanding loans. 8
4) A bank fund may use a broker that reciprocates by giving the
bank its business rather than seeking the best broker in terms of cost
and service. This is a more subtle conflict of interest and commensurate
with its subtlety, less likely to be subject to scrutiny. The Court of
Appeals recognized this and commented that it was not entirely satis-
fied with the assertion in the fund's prospectus that the objectives in
placing orders are to obtain the most favorable prices and executions
of orders and also, to deal with brokers who provide supplementary
research and statistical information or market quotations. 99 The Court,
however, concluded that the same problem arises with trust accounts
and since Congress exempted commingled trust accounts from the
operation of the Act that the danger should be considered minimal.10°
It must also be remembered that economical management of the
fund's account is in the bank's best interest as well as the participants'
since the management fee is computed on fund assets.1' 1 Whether it
would be more profitable for the bank to abuse the fund rather than
manage it economically is doubtful but, in any case, the "Watch dog"
operation of the unaffliated members of the committee would exercise
a prophylactic effect on possible abuse.102
ADDrIONAL PROBLEMS
Concentration
This comment, primarily has analyzed the hazards of a bank
operated CIF as they exist in a vacuum, that is, without regard to the
cumulative effect when combined with other banking activities. A
more complex problem arises when the scope of inquiry is extended
beyond the singular issue of bank participation in mutual funds and
into the dangers of concentration of wealth and power of banks in
general. Existing data shows that, at the conclusion of 1967, of the
$1 trillion in assets held by all institutions in the United States, banks
held more than $600 billion, $250 billion of which were held in trust.0 3
98 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
99 Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers v. See. & Exeh. Comm'n, 420 F.2d 83, 95
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
100 Id. Common trust funds are exempted by reason of 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
3(c)(3).
101 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (12) (1964).
102 The use of brokerage to receive reciprocal benefits is a type of self-dealing
which is prohibited by 12 C.F.R. § 9.12(a) (1964). The use of unaffiliated direc-
tors under the Investment Act has been the most effective deterrent to this type of
self-dealing. See generally Lehr, supra note 42, at 203-08.
103 Domestic Finance Report at 1.
Vol. 60
1972] CO~vMsMrs
The 100 largest banks held more than 82% of this $4 trillion, a good
portion of which was invested in voting stock of other corporations. 0 4
A survey of forty-nine banks holding $135 billion in trust assets showed
8,019 director interlocks between the banks and non-banking corpora-
tions. 05 The more significant issue then is to what extent the additional
acquisition of capital by banks through the assets of their CIF will
work a disservice to the public interest.
Bank control of non-bank corporations can arise out of two entirely
distinct functions and for entirely separate purposes. Firstly, a bank
may own the non-bank corporation through the use of a holding com-
pany which owns the bank as well as the non-banking interests. Here
the purpose of the control is outright ownership, much the same as a
conglomerate seeks diversification in non-related activities. This type
of domination has been severely restricted by the passage of the One
Bank Holding Company Act of 1970.106 This legislation together with
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956107 provides for registration of
all bank holding companies with the Federal Reserve Board which
exercises regulatory control over the holding company. The Act does
not prohibit bank holding companies but demands that the Federal
Reserve Board must approve any new acquisitions of banks by the
holding company. The Act further limits the kinds of businesses that
the holding company may engage in and the investments which it
can make in non-banking organizations. The purpose underlying the
holding company legislation is to increase competition among banks
by limiting concentration of bank ownership and to prevent dangers
arising from bank activity in non-banking industries. 08
The second type of domination involves concentration arising
indirectly from banks which make investments while in their fiduciary
role. Immediately it can be seen that the purpose underlying this
activity greatly differs from the situation where outright ownership is
sought. In fact a bank acting in its fiduciary capacity may not want to
gain control because of the problems of being "locked into" a corpora-
104 Id.
105 Id.
100 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et. seq. (1971 Supp.).
107 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et. seq. (1964).
108 See generally 8 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5520-22 (1970-71). The
1956 Bank Holding Company Act was designed to limit bank holding companies
to the ownership and management of banks. In addition it limited the size of the
holding company and prevented them from controlling non-banking assets. How-
ever the 1956 Act exempted all holding companies which controlled only one bank.
Thus a method of avoiding the 1956 Act was to obtain control of more than one
bank but with ownership of less than 25% of the bank's stock, 25% being the
definition of ownership under the Act. The 1970 legislation brought one bank




tion which may eventually become an unprofitable investment. How-
ever, as previously indicated, banks, because of their fiduciary activi-
ties, do exercise a limited, if not absolute, control in many non-banking
corporations. It is this domination that concerns opponents of the bank
operated CIF. Congress has not undertaken to discuss this issue in any
detail in any of the congressional hearings on CIF legislation. This is
understandable since the potential problem was raised only in a
general manner by mutual fund spokesmen who made vague references
to the danger of concentration without attempting to substantiate their
claims.109 Because of the notable absence of interest concerning this
issue it becomes a highly speculative endeavor to predict the amount
of new assets which will be funneled into bank activities by the addi-
tion of CIFs. It has been estimated that as much as $2 billion will be
garnered by bank operated CIFs in the first ten years of operation"0°
but changing investment patterns and limitations on CIF advertising
may well prove this figure to be exaggerated." But even if the
estimate proves true the growth of CIF assets would represent only a
miniscule addition to the more than $1 trillion of already existing
trust assets. It is more likely that any real growth will come from
management of pension and profit-sharing plans rather than from
109 1967 Hearings, supra note 4, at 1248 (statement of Robert Augenblick).
110 1964 Hearings, supra note 4, at 26.
111 It appears that the heady bull market days of the late 1960's are over for
the Mutual Fund Industry. According to recent data:
. . . The funds have just completed their worst net sales year since 1954
and simultaneously are immersed in a sea of other problems ranging from
low profits to new legal and ethical questions.
In no fewer than four months in 1971, fund stockholders actually
cashed in more shares than they bought for the first time since 1940,
when industry records begin. In fact, the industry would have run on a net
redemption basis for all of 1971 except for its practice of counting
reinvested dividends on fund shares as new sales. Industry sources
estimate 1971 net sales at $600 million, reinvested dividends at $800
million. And it's not that there hasn't been investment money. Bonds,
new closed-end funds and real-estate-investment trusts-though they
recently took a licking-have had big successes this year. 'This is money
that could have gone into mutual funds,' laments Harry B. Freeman,
Jr., president of the Channing Funds.
NEwswEEx, Jan. 10 1972 at 54.
On the other hand no-loaa mutual funds, which are similar to the First City fund,
have fared better than the load funds.Quick business quiz: how does a group of companies sell its product if
it has no salesmen? Answer: by making that fact a virtue-indeed, the
main merchandising point.
Whatever marketing professors might think of that reply, it describes
the strategy of the little known 'no-load' mutual funds. Four years ago,
there were 65 no-load funds. Now there are 160 with 1.4 million share-
holder accounts, a fourfold increase. Last year, when mutual funds as a
whole suffered an excess of redemptions over sales, the no-loads went on
registering increases in net sales.
TIM, March 6, 1972, at 66.
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CIFs. Whatever the amount that eventually will be amassed by CIFs
there is a further control beyond this fiduciary obligation to diversify
that will limit increased domination of non-banking industries. The
combined effect of Regulation 9112 and section 5 of the Investment
Company Act"18 will be to limit fund ownership of any corporation
to 10% of the outstanding stock of the corporation or 5% of fund
assets. Although it would still be possible to exercise some degree of
control with 10% of the outstanding stock when considered against
the nature of the banking activity the dangers seem minimal.
The more pervasive question of whether bank domination has
reached a point that it should be legislatively reduced is, of course,
beyond the scope of this paper. It appears that to a large extent the
issue was raised in relation to CIF legislation as a catch all by mutual
fund spokesmen in the hope of appropriating whatever support there
is for a reduction of bank growth. If legislation is needed to restrict
bank power it should not be applied piecemeal at the insistence of a
special interest group but only after proper investigation shows that
limitation would be in the public interest.
CIF Personnel
An additional danger which, strictly speaking, does not arise under
either the Investment Act or the Banking Act, is the shortage of
experienced mutual fund and bank management personnel. The
problem has arisen because the numerical growth of qualified person-
nel has not kept pace with the rapid expansion of mutual funds and the
increase in bank management activities. 14 The resulting possibility
is that bank CIFs might not be able to obtain the knowledgeable per-
sonnel necessary to adequately protect fund assets. Although this prob-
lem may be characterized as a temporary one which will be solved as
the public's interest in mutual funds levels off, it should not be dis-
missed as merely a cyclical difficulty. Billions of dollars are entrusted
to mutual fund and bank management personnel and a failure to
properly invest these funds, even for a short period of time, could
11212 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(9)(ii) (1964).
No investment for a collective investment fund shall be made in stocks,
bonds or other obligations of any one person, firm or corporation if as a
result of such investment the total amount invested in stocks, bonds or
other obligations issued or guaranteed by such person, firm or corporation
would aggregate in excess of ten per cent of the then market value of the
fund: Provided, That this limitation shall not apply to investments in
direct obligations of the United States or other obligations fully guaran-
teed by the United States as to principal and interest.
11315 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1) (1964).
114Lehr, supra note 42, at 191-94.
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bring a sufficiently adverse public reaction as to dry up a much needed
source of capital for industry. The real crux of the matter is the
extent to which bank operated CIFs would add to the expansion of
mutual funds and further deplete the pool of experienced personnel.
There is no exact answer to this question but it is likely that bank
participation will, to some extent, add to this imbalance of fund growth
versus experienced personnel. On the other hand since 93% of mutual
fund investors in 1967 invested less than $10,000115 it may be that
banks, with their $10,000 minimum, will have less of an impact than
expected, at least as to new money brought into funds. Unfortunately
this potential danger has been largely ignored in congressional hearings
on CIF legislation. It is known, however, that lack of competent
personnel has been a contributing factor to an increasing number of
bank mergers within the last several years.116 Since it is the public's
interest, not the banking industry's, which lies at the heart of any
proposed legislation, it is fundamental that any question as to fund
management be closely analyzed to protect the fund's investors.
Bmmnrrs
The previous discussion may be considered the negative side of a
bank operated CIF but, as in most cases, there is a corresponding
positive side. The load charge received by most mutual fund com-
panies is a problem that has received recent congressional attention.
It is apparent that the closely knit mutual fund industry has spawned
a service charge that is excessive, being the result of a lack of mean-
ingful competition. The Investment Company Act of 1970117 has
attempted to reduce the load charge by self-regulation through the
National Association of Securities Dealers under the watchful eye of
the SEC. It is hoped that fees will be reduced in this manner rather
than by regulatory decree, but it seems more in keeping with time
honored American tradition that rates be set by competition in the
marketplace rather than by legislation. Banks offer that competition.
The bank service charge of 1% per annum on fund assets will com-
pare favorably with the 7V2-8% load charge now offered by most
mutual funds. At a time when brokerage charges are on the increase
the small investor is in need of this competition to allow him the most
economical avenue to the market.
115 Hearings on H.R. 9510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at
155 (1967).
116 Lehr, supra note 42, at 191-92.
117 Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1418.
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Bankers have consistently argued that a bank operated IF is in
keeping with traditional banking services and that it represents no
more than a combination of the commingled trust account and the
managing agency account, both of which it is presently entitled to
operate." 8 A contrary argument is that the combination of these func-
tions represents something entirely new, that "differences of degree
become differences of kind."" 9 The semantics of this may be argued
indefinitely but within a practical context the managing agency ac-
count as now operated allows a bank to invest and re-invest the assets
of an individual for the sole purpose of appreciation of capital, much
the same as it would do for a group of individuals under a CIF. How-
ever where the minimum amount for an individual managing agency
account is $200,000120 the minimum for entry into a CIF will be
$10,000. This will allow many small investors to be able to have the
full range of their financial needs taken care of under one roof. The
benefit to the public is a more convenient and more consistent handling
of their financial affairs.
As previously stated, the entry of banks into mutual funds can not
be viewed in a vacuum but must be examined within the totality of
bank activities. If banks are denied access to an activity which is so
closely akin to their present day functions it is likely that the banking
industry has reached the last of its expansionist activities and will be
harnessed in its present situation for some time to come. Bankers
argue that to prevent the natural growth of dynamic banking will work
to stultify the industry, thus resulting in a decrease in the imaginative
personnel now operating banks with a corresponding danger that a
banking industry unduly restricted to activities of the past will cease
to be an innovative factor in the growth of our economy.121 The history
118 .Mundheim, supra note 10, at 14; see also, 1967 Hearings at 1228
(statement of Dean Miller).
The pooling by banks of small fiduciary accounts into more economically
manageable units, however one chooses to label it, is nothing more than
the combination of two financial services which banks have made available
to their customers for many years. These are the management of invest-
ment portfolios for their customers, and the operation of commingled
funds for the more economical investment of monies held as a fiduciary.
119 1966 Hearings at 80 (statement of Eugene Rostow).
The present proposal is justified as a modest enlargement of existing
practice and the common trust fund exemption from securities statutes.
But the CIF proposals represent something quite different, and quite new.
They would permit the banks to act as investment advisers and managers
on a novel scale, going far beyond the historic limits of their fiduciary
services. Here, as is often the case, differences of degree become differ-
ences in kind.
20 1966 Hearings, supra note 4, at 200-01 (brief of First National City Bank
Before the SEC).
121 See generally Harfield, supra note 1, at 578-79.
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of bank services has been one that has constantly grown with the needs
of the public it serves. Whether it be the management of trusts or the
introduction of bank credit cards, banks have been at the forefront of
providing service to the expanding needs of the public. It is undeniable
that the availability of bank capital and expertise in these areas has had
a beneficial result in the nation's economic expansion. Whether as a
nation we can afford the price of a static banking industry is conjec-
tural but the final decision on bank operated CIFs may well set the
tenor for bank activity for years to come.
CONCLUSION
The attempt to approve bank operated CIFs has been described as
"the kind of situation the doctor faces in confronting a medical problem
he thought was solved fifty years ago, and he does not recognize the
symptoms." 12 2 To a large extent this attitude underlies much of the
opposition to bank entry into mutual funds. It is thinking born in the
dreary days of the depression and nurtured through the years, either
consciously or subconsciously, but it has no application when applied
to bank operated CIFs. The abuses of the 20's and 30's are simply not
relevant within this context. There is no denying that some abuse is
possible but nothing would ever be gained if absolute freedom from
abuse was the criterion. When applied to the CIF, the possibility of
abuse is just not sufficient to prevent an activity that will benefit the
investing public.
With the overshadowing spectre of judicial activity now gone, the
issue is squarely before Congress. Legislation should again be intro-
duced to allow bank operated CIFs and this time, approval should be
granted.
James G. Woltermann
122 R. Mundheim, supra note 10, at 15-16.
